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Abstract 
Over the last decades, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been one of the 
dominant topics in financial research literature. Inspired by cognitive psychology 
studies, “overreaction” and “underreaction” are one of the most important challenges to 
the EMH. 
The main purpose of our study is to explore the existence of return continuation in the 
Portuguese Stock Market, thus investigating its efficiency at the weak form level (Fama, 
1970). We demonstrate that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the 
past and sell stocks that have poor performances previously – momentum strategies – 
can generate significant positive returns over three to twelve months holding periods. 
As in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we found that the profitability of momentum 
strategies is not satisfactorily justified by delayed stock price reactions. When 
comparing the momentum strategy profits with the profitability of the equally weighted 
market portfolio, we verified that it is possible to obtain higher returns through this 
relative strength strategy. We also analyze the momentum profits over long horizons. In 
this matter, our results seem to support the underreaction hypothesis, but our outcomes 
are not conclusive, since there is no sufficient statistic evidence.  
 
Keywords: Overreaction; Underreaction; Momentum; Market Efficiency; Behavioral 
Finance. 
JEL: G1; G11 and G14. 
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Resumo 
Nas últimas décadas, a Hipótese de Eficiência de Mercado (HEM) tem sido um dos 
temas dominantes na literatura financeira. Com base na psicologia cognitiva, as 
hipóteses de “sobre-reação” e “sub-reação” dos preços colocam-se como um dos mais 
importantes desafios à HEM.  
Assim, o principal objetivo do nosso trabalho é explorar a existência de continuação dos 
retornos no mercado de capitais português, investigando a sua eficiência na forma fraca 
(Fama, 1970). De acordo com os resultados obtidos, estratégias que compram ações 
com boas performances no passado e que vendem ações com performances fracas – 
estratégias de momentum – geram retornos positivos significativos, para períodos de 
manutenção de três a doze meses. Tal como em Jegadeesh e Titman (1993), 
descobrimos que a rendibilidade das estratégias de momentum não é satisfatoriamente 
justificada pela reação tardia dos preços das ações. Quando a rendibilidade das 
estratégias de momentum é comparada com a rendibilidade do portefólio de mercado 
igualmente ponderado, verificamos que é possível obter retornos mais elevados através 
da estratégia estudada. A rendibilidade das estratégias de momentum foi, também, 
analisada no longo prazo, tendo sido encontrada evidência que suporta a hipótese de 
“sub-reação”. No entanto, os resultados alcançados neste domínio não são conclusivos, 
uma vez que não possuímos evidência estatística suficientemente significativa. 
 
Palavras-chave: Sobre-reação; Sub-reação; Momentum; Eficiência e Finanças 
Comportamentais 
Códigos JEL: G1; G11 e G14. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decades, the Efficient Market Hypothesis has been one of the dominant 
topics in financial research literature.  
According to Fama (1970, p.383), in an efficient market, prices “always fully reflect 
available information”. Therefore, prices could be considered an unbiased estimate of 
the true value of an investment at any given moment. 
The concept of Efficient Market Hypothesis reached such a height of dominance around 
the 1970’s that any deviation in financial markets has been called anomaly. 
Subsequently, the 1980’s has witnessed the proliferation of reported anomalies, in 
which are included, among others, “underreaction”   and   “overreaction” (Wang, 2008):  
“If stock prices either overreact or underreact to information, then profitable trading 
strategies that select stocks based on their past returns will exist.” Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993, p.68)  
According to these anomalies, investors may be able to conceive profitable strategies 
based on past returns’ observation. Considering the existence of this possibility, the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis can be seriously questioned. For that reason, the 
investigation of these anomalies has attracted the interest of many financial researchers 
and market professionals that want to explore this inefficiency.  
The seminal works by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), about overreaction and underreaction, respectively, were the first to show that it 
was possible to consider that stocks returns are related to their past performances. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) based on the overreaction hypothesis, analyzed the 
profitability of contrarian strategies (buy the past losers and sell the past winners), 
concluding that stocks with poor performances in the last three to five years earn higher 
average returns than stocks that perform well. 
On the other hand, based on underreaction hypothesis, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
report medium-term continuation of equity returns. The authors suggested that 
momentum strategies (buy the past winners and sell the past losers) result in profits of 
about 1 percent per month in the year following the portfolios’ formation.  
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The main base of momentum strategies is the continuation of existing trends in the 
market. The basic idea is that investors will buy winner and sell loser stocks, because it 
is more likely that a rising asset price continues to rise further than the opposite, at least 
in the short-term (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
For the Portuguese stock market, few studies analyzed, exclusively, the predictability of 
Portuguese stock returns based on their past performances and even fewer have focused 
on the profitability of momentum strategies. 
Alves and Duque (1996) studied the performance of contrarian strategies over the 
period of 1989 to 1994, but their results were inconclusive. Soares and Serra (2005), 
beyond analyzing the contrarian strategies with an extended sample1, also investigated 
the existence of momentum returns. However, some of their results lack statistical 
significance. More recently, Pereira (2009) also focused on this issue, studying the 
profitability of momentum and contrarian strategies; similarly to Soares and Serra 
(2005) most of the obtained results are not statistically significant.   
Thus, we verify that the lack of statistically significant results, that prove or disprove 
the existence of return predictability based on past returns in Portuguese stock market, 
is transversal to the studies done so far. Reason why, we decided to focus our study in 
this thematic, more specifically in the momentum strategies, in order to provide 
additional evidence to what has already been found in this regard. 
Our study present some differences from the precedent studies for the Portuguese stock 
market, as we use an extended sample (approximately 24 years), similarly to the sample 
periods used in the main international studies. We will follow the Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) methodology, with the division of the sample into deciles, and, finally, our study 
will be the first to focus exclusively in the performance of momentum strategies.  
Additionally, by examining the profitability of several momentum strategies, our work 
intends to investigate the efficiency of the Portuguese stock market at the weak form 
level, according to Fama (1970). In case this market is efficient in its weak form, 
current prices will fully reflect all historical information. Consequently, abnormal 
                                                           
1
 Soares and Serra (2005) sample period goes from 1988 to 2003 (16 Years). 
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returns cannot be obtained. In conclusion, this study essentially seeks to answer the 
following research questions: 
 
- Is there any possibility to predict future returns, based on past performance, in the 
short-term? 
- Can momentum strategies generate significant positive returns over three to twelve 
months2 holding periods? And can these strategies outperform the market portfolio 
returns?  
- Do the momentum strategies exhibit long-term return reversals in the Portuguese 
Stock Market? 
 
To address these issues we will follow, primarily, the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
work, as a reference to construct the different momentum strategies and the further tests 
and analysis.  
Using a monthly sample that goes from January 1988 to April 2012, we will construct 
32 different strategies. Initially, we will verify, for each one of these strategies, the 
profitability of winner portfolios over losers. Later, we will focus only on one strategy 
aiming to analyze other variants of the portfolios and the profitability of this strategy 
over long horizons.     
The work proceeds as follows. Firstly, section 2 provides a brief review of the relevant 
literature and section 3 presents the data and the methodology. In section 4 we show the 
empirical results and the main findings. Finally, section 5 presents the principal 
conclusions of our study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2
 The period normally used in all studies on momentum strategies is three to twelve months. 
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2. Literature Review 
The present section gives a brief literature review of the main international studies and 
the major evidence for the Portuguese stock market on contrarian and, specially, on 
momentum strategies. 
The literature review will be divided into two subsections. In the first one, we introduce 
the different trading strategies, Contrarian and Momentum. More specifically, for 
momentum strategies, we refer some seasonal and size effects, as well as the evolution 
of momentum profits over long horizons.  Subsection 2.2 will present the various 
models and theories that attempt to explain momentum returns.  
 
2.1. Trading Strategies – Market (In)Efficiency 
One of the most important topics in financial literature is the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). This concept is the foundation for much of the theoretical and 
empirical research in this area (Jegadeesh, 1990).  
According to Fama (1970, p.383), in an efficient market, prices “always fully reflect 
available information”. The author characterized three forms of efficiency:  weak, semi-
strong and strong. In our study, we test the weak form level, which relies on the premise 
that current prices fully reflect all historical information. Consequently, as information 
is available to all, abnormal returns should not be earned.  
Considerable effort has been expended testing the market efficiency hypothesis, 
resulting in several empirical studies that have documented consistent and significant 
anomalies which cast doubt over its reliability (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996, 
p.1681). 
Among these anomalies is the possible relation between the average stock returns and 
the past performance. We will refer, in this literature review, to two different trading 
strategies that rely on this possibility: Contrarian and Momentum strategies.  
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2.1.1. Contrarian Strategies 
Contrarian strategies are based on the assumption that investors overreact to new 
information and, consequently, prices tend to differ from their fundamental values. 
Therefore, these strategies consist on buying long-term past losers and selling long-term 
past winners (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). 
Challenging the notions of market efficiency and investors rationality, De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987) report that stocks with poor performance in the last three to five 
years earn higher average returns than stocks that perform well, i.e., long-term past 
losers tend to outperform long-term past winners over the subsequent three to five 
years. They found that, for NYSE market, thirty-six months after the portfolio 
formation, the losers’ portfolio receives about 25% more than the winners’ portfolio.  
Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) showed similar results and conclude that, in the 
long-term (three to five years), there are price reversals, which implies that contrarian 
strategies are profitable when implemented based on such time horizons. 
Furthermore, some individual studies, performed at a country level, sustained the 
existence of long-term price reversals in stock returns. For instance, according to the 
work of Campbell and Limmack (1997), contrarian strategies yield abnormal returns 
(until a one-year period after the portfolio formation) in the U.K. stock market from the 
period of 1979 to 1990.  Alonso and Rubio (1990) investigated the Spanish stock 
market and found existence of contrarian profits on 12 to 60 months. Mai (1995) 
presents similar results to French stock market and Da Costa (1994) show equivalent 
results to Brazilian stocks. 
Analyzing the Portuguese market, we have discovered a small amount of studies 
regarding contrarian strategies. Alves and Duque (1996) studied in particular the 
performance of this long-term strategy over the period of 1989 to 1994, but their results 
were inconclusive.  
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Soares and Serra (2005) explored whether Portuguese stock returns are related to past 
performance for an extended sample and time period3. Contrarily to Alves and Duque 
(1996), the authors evaluated not only the existence of contrarian returns but also the 
existence of momentum profits. Concerning contrarian strategies, their results seem to 
support the overreaction hypothesis in the long run. However, most of their results lack 
statistical significance. 
Pereira (2009) concluded that the contrarian profitability exists, but his findings are not 
so evident as in Soares and Serra (2005). They attribute the results’ differences to the 
different time periods analyzed.4  
Regarding long-term reversals, De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), and Chopra et al. 
(1992) stand their results on the cognitive psychology findings of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982). These authors believe that investors overweight recent information, 
ignoring or attributing less importance to past information in their prospects. 
Consequently, stock prices also overreact, moving away from their fundamental values. 
In shorter horizons, Jegadeesh (1990), Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
examined the performance of trading strategies, based on one week to one month 
returns and provided evidence of return reversals. Jegadeesh (1990) found that the 
difference between the risk-adjusted excess returns on the extreme deciles portfolios is 
2.49 percent per month, over the period of 1934 to 1987.  
Yet, in the short-term, contrarian strategies are not explained by overreaction. Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) argued that a large part of these short-term returns are due to delayed 
price reaction to new information, while Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) pointed out the  
price pressure or the lack of liquidity in the markets as explanatory factors, since these 
strategies are transaction intensive. 
Despite the popularity of contrarian strategies in academic literature, most recently 
researchers focused on momentum strategies that buys winners and sells losers. 
                                                           
3
 Soares and Serra (2005) analyzed the performance of all the stocks listed in the main market between 
1988 and 2003. 
4
 Pereira (2009) used a sample period from 1999 to 2008, while Soares and Serra (2005) sample is from 
1988 to 2003. 
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 “Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) add a new twist to this literature by documenting that 
over an intermediate  horizon  of  three  to  twelve  months,  past  winners  on  average 
continue  to  outperform  past  losers,  so  that  there  is "momentum" in stock prices.” 
Chan et al. (1996, p.1681) 
 
2.1.2. Momentum Strategies 
A momentum strategy aims to capitalize on the continuance of existing trends in the 
market. This strategy is based on the belief that large price increases of a security will 
be followed by additional gains and vice versa for declining values. The fundamental 
idea is that the investor will buy winner stocks and sell loser, because, according to this 
strategy, it is more likely that a rising asset price continues to rise further than to move 
against the trend (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).  
In the early literature about this subject, Levy (1967) claimed that a trading rule 
involving a stock purchase when its current price is substantially higher than its average 
over the last 27 weeks tends to realize abnormal returns.   
After analyzing this trading rule over an extended time period, Jensen and Bennington 
(1970) attribute Levy’s results to selection bias, since they proved that trading strategy 
is not more profitable than a simple buy and hold strategy. 
Adding a new twist to this literature, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) provided evidence in 
favour of the profitability of momentum strategies in the US markets (NYSE and 
AMEX), between 1965 and 1989. The authors exposed that, over medium-term 
horizons (three to twelve months), stocks with higher returns will continue to 
outperform stocks with low past returns, over the same period of time. For instance, the 
six-month winners (stocks whose past six-month returns rank in the top decile) 
outperformed the six-month losers (stocks whose past six-month returns rank in the 
bottom decile) with an average excess return of about 1 percent per month, over the 
following six months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
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Similar results can be found in Rouwenhorst (1998) with a sample of 12 European stock 
markets5 during the period from 1978 to 1995. Rouwenhorst’s results demonstrate that 
an internationally diversified relative strength portfolio, which invests in medium-term 
winners and sells medium-term losers, earns around 1 percent per month after 
accounting for risk. Additionally, Rouwenhorst (1999) found that momentum strategies 
are profitable, although not in the same degree, in 20 emerging markets6.  
The original findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) appear to be applicable in other 
markets besides the United States’. Beyond the results provided by Rouwenhorst (1998, 
1999), according to Hart, Slagter and Dijk (2003) there is evidence of medium-term 
return continuation in another 32 emerging markets7. Chui, Wei and Titman (2000) 
documented that, with exception of Japan and Korea, momentum strategies work in 
Asian markets8 too. Foerster, Prihar, and Schmitz (1995) followed a similar strategy to 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), using Canadian data from 1978 to 1993, and recognized 
stronger evidence of momentum stock returns.  
Diverging Chui et al. (2000) conclusions for the Japanese stock market, Chaves (2012) 
shows that momentum strategies can be profitable in Japan, but only when the return 
component due to market beta exposure is removed, thus reducing the volatility of 
momentum strategies (Chaves, 2012). 
In the same study, Chaves (2012) examined the profitability of momentum strategies in 
21 countries9, including Portugal. Besides the limited sample10, Portugal has one of the 
                                                           
5
 Rouwenhorst (1998) considered in his sample twelve European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.  
6
 Rouwenhorst (1999) examined 20 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
7
 The 32 markets analyzed by Hart et al. (2003) are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Morocco, South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
8 Besides Japan and Korea, Chui et al. (2000) examine Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. 
9
 Chaves (2012) examine momentum strategies in 21 different countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
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best performances of “traditional” Momentum (without any adjustments for the market 
beta exposure) close to Denmark, Australia and Canada.  
On the other hand, Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) have also considered Portugal in their 
international sample. However, they found that there were no statistical significant 
momentum profits, at a five percent level, for the Portuguese stock market.  
Specifically for this stock market, Soares and Serra (2005), that also studied contrarian 
strategies, demonstrated the profitability of momentum strategies for short-term 
horizons. The authors considered a sample of 82 stocks, from 1988 to 2003 (16 years), 
which are ranked into quintiles. They concluded that momentum effects persist even 
after the risks have been accounted for. Nevertheless, most results lack statistical 
significance. 
Recently, Pereira (2009) examined the existence of momentum and contrarian profits in 
the Portuguese stock market, from January 1997 until December 2008. The author 
found that, for formation and holding periods of one to twelve months, the monthly 
average returns of the top winners’ portfolio are 0.97 percent; while the top losers’ 
portfolio’s monthly average returns are about -0.16 percent, thus concluding that a 
momentum strategy can provide returns of approximately 1 percent. However, similarly 
to Soares and Serra (2005), most of these results are not statistically significant.  
Considering the popularity and visibility of this market “anomaly”, according to the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), the profitability of momentum strategies 
should cease to exist. However, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001b) show that momentum 
profits have continued in the 90’s11, demonstrating that the original results were not a 
product of data snooping bias, as noted by Lo and MacKinlay (1990). 
After Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) revolutionary work, this thematic has attracted 
substantial research, which documents more details about this “anomaly”. In the next 
subsections, we will present some of these studies that attempts to correlate momentum 
profits to stock characteristics. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10
 The Portuguese sample was constituted by 267 monthly observations (about 22 years), being one of the 
smallest samples used on Chaves' (2012) study. 
11
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) use a sample period from 1965 to 1989 and in their 2001 study use a 
sample period from 1965 to 1998. 
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2.1.2.1. Seasonality and Size Effect 
Some researchers demonstrated that momentum strategies can exhibit an interesting 
pattern of seasonality, especially in January. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) pointed out 
that, between 1965 and 1989, momentum strategy lost about 7 percent on average in 
January months, but generated positive returns in each of the other months.  
More recently, Grundy and Martin (2001) found that only 15 of the 69 January months’ 
returns, from 1926 to 1995, are positive. In January, the average return of momentum 
strategies is -5.85 percent. In contrast, 491 of the 759 non-January months’ returns are 
positive, with a mean of 1.01 percent, over the same period. 
The momentum strategy implemented on Jegadeesh and Titman’s (2001a) sample earns 
a return of -1.55 percent in January and positive returns in every other calendar month. 
Therefore, the authors conclude that much of the size effect and long horizon return 
reversals are concentrated in January, while the momentum effect is entirely a non-
January effect. 
Then again, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), as well as Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), 
show that momentum profits tend to be stronger in December, followed by April and 
November. 
Several studies focus on the relation between momentum profits and stock 
characteristics, giving a special emphasis to the firm size. Most of them found that 
momentum profits are negatively correlated to the firm size (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993, 2001b; Rouwenhorst, 1998; and Hong et al., 2000). However, some texts 
conclude otherwise (Israel and Moskowitz, 2012). 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001b) found that both winners and losers tend to be 
smaller than the average firm size of the sample. In the authors’ opinion, smaller firms 
are more likely to be in the extreme return decile portfolios, since they have more 
volatile returns. Yet, the average size of the winner’s portfolio tends to be larger than 
the loser’s.  
Baker and Wurgler (2007) associate the high-volatility to low capitalization and 
unprofitable stocks, affirming that these stocks tend to be disproportionately sensitive to 
11 
 
investor sentiments. This occurs as small stocks are harder to arbitrage and more 
difficult to evaluate, “making the biases more insidious and valuation mistakes more 
likely” (Baker and Wurgler, 2007, p. 130). 
According to Rouwenhorst (1998) return continuation is negatively related with the firm 
size, but it is not limited to small firms. Similarly, Hong et al. (2000) found that the 
profitability of momentum strategies tends to decline sharply with the increase of firms’ 
size. 
In contrast, the results of Chui et al. (2000), for some Asian stock markets, provide 
weak evidence that support the negative relation mentioned above. 
Israel and Moskowitz (2011) found that significant momentum returns are present 
across size categories. According to these authors, there is no considerable evidence that 
sustain the higher momentum returns among small firms’ stocks. 
In conclusion, there are no consensual results on these matters. 
 
2.1.2.2. Momentum Strategies over Long Horizons 
In the long run, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) supported that losers tend to outperform 
winners. As a result, momentum strategies should not be profitable in such horizons. 
Their conclusion attracted momentum researchers’ attention in order to study what 
usually happens with this type of profits in the long-term period. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documented that momentum profits slowly dissipate over 
long horizons. For instance, a zero-cost portfolio strategy12, based on the past six 
months, generates a cumulative return of 9.5 percent over the first year, but loses more 
than a half of this return in the following two years. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) confirmed these results and found significant price 
reversals between the third and the fifth year. Additionally, the authors demonstrated 
that past trading volume is related with both the magnitude and the persistence of price 
                                                           
12
 A zero-cost portfolio strategy consists on buying the winner’s portfolio and selling the loser’s portfolio 
(Rouwenhorst, 1998). 
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momentum, concluding that stocks with higher past transaction volume tend to 
experience faster return reversals. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1999) examined the returns in each of the 60 months following 
the portfolios’ constitution date (formation date), founding significant positive returns in 
the first 12 months. However, when they considered the 13-60 months period, the 
returns were negative. By the end of the 60st month, the cumulative momentum returns 
have declined to -0.44 percent.  
On the other hand, George and Hwang (2004) showed that future returns, estimated 
using a 52-week high criterion, don’t reverse in the long run. Therefore, they suggest 
that short-term momentum and long-term reversals are not likely to be components of 
the same phenomenon. 
 
2.2. Causes of Momentum Profits 
While the momentum profitability in short horizons have been well accepted, financial 
economists are far from reaching consensus on the causes of momentum profits. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001a) considers the underreaction to new information as a 
natural explanation for those profits. 
“(…) if a firm releases good news and stock prices only react partially to the good news, 
then buying the stocks after the initial release of the news will generate profits. 
However, this is not the only source of momentum profits.” Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001a, p.7) 
In case momentum profits are indeed driven by underreaction, the good performance of 
a winner portfolio will continue until all the news is incorporated in prices. Chan et al. 
(1996) and Hong et al. (2000) found evidence consistent with this explanation. 
As we have already referred, some authors documented that momentum profits revert 
on long horizons. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001b) 
interpreted this long term reversion as a consequence of, not only underreaction, but 
delayed overreaction. Good news in the pre-formation date period pushes post-
formation prices above fundamental value. Consequently, strategies that buy winners 
and sell losers will be profitable in the short-run. However, these deviations from 
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fundamental values are only temporary and cumulative momentum profits will 
disappear or even turn negative in the long-run. 
“Continuation and contrarian theories say that prices underreact and overreact, 
respectively; the efficiency theory allows neither” Ray et al. (1995, p.54) 
While some have argued that these results provide strong evidence of “market 
inefficiency,” others affirmed that the returns from these strategies are either a 
compensation for risk (Chan, 1988; Fama and French, 1996), a product of size/seasonal 
anomalies (Zarowin, 1989), or a product of biases in the way that investors interpret 
information (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; and Daniel 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). 
 
2.2.1. Momentum profits as a Compensation for Risk 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, investors cannot earn extra returns without 
bearing extra risk (Fama, 1970). Therefore, momentum and contrarian strategies present 
a challenge to the efficient market theory, by providing abnormal returns. 
Some researchers identify the existence of patterns, typically called anomalies, in 
average stocks returns that Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) cannot explain. In 
consequence of this limitation, Fama and French (1996) present their Three-Factor 
Model.  This model seams to capture much of the cross-section variation. Nevertheless, 
it was not able to explain the returns continuation over short-term periods. 
“The main embarrassment of the three-factor model, (is) its failure to capture the 
continuation of short-term returns documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Asness (1994)” Fama and French (1996, p.81) 
Some authors tested whether cross-sectional differences in risk may explain momentum 
profits, by examining risk adjusted returns under specific asset pricing models. For 
example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) adjusted their results for risk using the CAPM13, 
while Fama and French (1996) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001b) used the Three-
                                                           
13
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) shows that momentum profits can’t be explained by the market risk. The 
authors find that the best performers appear to be no more risky than the worst performers.  Therefore, 
standard risk adjustments tend to increase rather than decrease the return spread between past winners and 
past losers.  
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Factor Model. Their results indicate that the cross-sectional differences in expected 
returns under the two asset pricing models cannot explain momentum profits.   
“However, it is possible that these models omit some priced factors and hence provide 
inadequate adjustments for differences in risk.” Jegadeesh and Titman (2001a, p.10) 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) admitted that it is premature to reject the rational models and 
have suggested a momentum risk-based interpretation. According to the authors, 
momentum profits could be entirely due to cross-sectional variations in mean returns 
rather than to any predictable time-series variations in stock returns. They started with 
the hypothesis that stock prices follow random walks with drifts that vary across stocks. 
The differences in these unconditional drifts explain momentum profits. Consequently, 
winner portfolios should continue to significantly outperform loser portfolios by the 
same magnitude, in any post-holding period. 
However, as we have already referred, Jegadeesh and Titman (1999) concluded that, in 
the long run (13-60 months), momentum profits, not only tended to disappear, but also 
turned negative. This evidence clearly rejects the Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis 
which suggests that the winners will continue to outperform the losers outside the 
momentum strategy holding period. 
Even Jegadeesh and Titman (1999) referred their surprise, as they reached very different 
conclusions after examining essentially the same data as Conrad and Kaul (1998). To 
reconcile these conflicting findings, the authors reexamined Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
procedures to better understand why their conclusions were so different. They found 
that Conrad and Kaul (1998) had a small sample bias, which allowed extreme 
observations to be drawn in two, biasing momentum profits upwards. Therefore, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1999) concluded that the momentum profits observed were not 
generated by cross-sectional variation in returns, but due to the stocks returns  
time-series properties. 
Grundy and Martin’s (2001) evidence also contradicts the risk-based explanations. The 
authors found that, between 1926 and 1995, the risk adjusted profitability of momentum 
strategies is more than 1.34 percent per month (with an associated t-statistic of 12.11). 
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In summary, current risk-based explanations fail to fully account for the momentum 
effect. Contrasting Conrad and Kaul (1998) results, the behavioral models suggest that 
the post-holding period returns of the momentum portfolio have a propensity to be 
negative. 
“Although the negative post-formation returns of the momentum portfolio appear to 
support the predictions of the behavioral models, based on our further analysis, we 
suggest that this support should be interpreted with caution.” Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1999, p.13) 
 
2.2.2. The Behavioral Models 
Given the limitations of risk-based explanations for momentum profits, some 
researchers have turned their attentions to behavioral models in order to clarify this 
occurrence. 
The behavioral models attempt to explain the momentum profits through investors’ 
overconfidence or by the way that investors interpret firm’s specific information. These 
models are based on the idea that momentum profits arise because of inherent biases 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001a). 
In Barberis et al.’s (1998) model, there is a representative investor who suffers from a 
conservatism bias and does not sufficiently update his beliefs when he observes new 
public information. As a result, prices will slowly adjust to information and, once the 
information is fully incorporated in prices, there is no further predictability about stock 
returns. 
The authors argued that the representative heuristic14 may lead investors to mistakenly 
conclude that a winner portfolio will continue to win in the future. Although the 
conservatism bias in isolation leads to underreaction, this behavioral tendency, in 
conjunction with the representative heuristic, can lead to price overshooting. Therefore, 
in the long-term, prices will readjust to their fundamental values, causing returns 
reversals. 
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 Representative heuristic is the tendency of individuals to identify “an uncertain event, or a sample, by 
the degree to which it is similar to the parent population.” Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p.1124) 
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“What causes intermediate-term momentum but long-term overreaction?”[...] “The 
answer is heuristic-driven bias." Shefrin (2000, p.103)  
Daniel et al. (1998) proposed a model that is also consistent with the short-term 
momentum and the long-term reversals (overreaction). They suggested that the behavior 
of informed traders can be characterized by two psychological biases:  
“(…) investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased 
self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of 
their investment outcomes”. Daniel et al. (1998, p.1839) 
According to their model, an overconfident investor overestimates his ability to 
generate information or to identify the significance of existing data that others neglect. 
The overconfident investors perceive themselves as more able to value stocks than they 
actually are, so, they underestimate their forecast error variance. Due to self-attribution 
bias, when investors receive a confirming public information, their confidence rises, but 
the inverse causes confident to fall only modestly, if at all.  For example, investors 
attribute ex-post winners to their stock selection skills and the ex-post losers to external 
noise or bad luck. Based on their increased confidence in their signals, they push up the 
prices of the winners above their fundamental values, causing momentum in security 
prices (Daniel et al., 1998). The authors concluded that overconfidence leads to 
negative long-run autocorrelations while biased self-attribution results in positive short-
run autocorrelations.    
Hong and Stein (1999) do not directly appeal to any behavioral biases, but they consider 
two types of investors who trade based on different sets of information. The informed 
investors or the “news watchers” obtain signals about future cash flows but ignore 
information in historical prices. The other investors, the “momentum traders”, make 
forecasts based on history of past prices and, in addition, do not observe fundamental 
information. The authors assume also that information diffuses gradually across 
population. The information obtained by the “news watchers” is transmitted with delay 
and, hence, is only partially incorporated in the prices (underreaction). The “momentum 
trader” bases his trade only on the price changes over some prior interval and tends to 
push prices of past winners above their fundamental values (Hong and Stein, 1999). 
This model accepts the existence of return reversals when prices, eventually, revert to 
their fundamentals. 
17 
 
Using Hong and Stein (1999) example, in case we have good news at the moment t and 
no change in fundamentals after all, the “news watchers” will push the prices up, but not 
enough. At moment t+1, the “momentum traders” will buy these stocks, pushing the 
prices up again. This round of momentum trading creates a further price increase 
leading to a further round of momentum trading, and so on. When “momentum traders” 
implement “naive momentum strategies” based on past price trends, their trades will 
finally lead to overreaction in long horizons. 
As we can see, behavioral models present a number of different interesting facts to 
explain the existence of momentum profits. However, financial investigators are far 
from reaching consensus on what generates momentum profits, turning this subject into 
an interesting area for future research. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
This section intends to expose the data used in this study and the methodology adopted. 
In the following subsection (3.1), we will present the main data that we have collected 
for constitute our sample and in the subsequent subsection (3.2) we will detail the 
methodological steps that we have followed in order to reach our final results, including 
all the assumptions and tests made. 
3.1. Data 
Our study is centered in the Portuguese stock market – NYSE15 Euronext Lisbon, more 
specifically in the stocks that integrate the PSI16 Geral.  
The sample period runs from January 1988 to April 2012 (about 23 years), in order to 
meet the needs of data required by this kind of empirical studies. For instance, 
Rouwenhorst (1998) considered 17 years (from 1978 to 1995) and Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) used 24 years (1965 to 1989) in their samples. Thus, our study provides 
the most extensive sample used for the analysis of momentum profitability in the 
Portuguese stock market.  
For a specific stock to be included in our sample, it must belong to the PSI Geral and 
must have been traded continuously at least for 25 months, since one of our strategies 
needs 12 months as observation period (J), 1 month of delay between the observation 
and the formation of the portfolio and 12 months of holding period (K). 
Using Datastream database, we have collected the Total Return Index (TRI) instead of 
daily prices. Thereby, we can obtain the stock returns adjusted for stock splits, 
dividends and right issues. 
All stocks, except one, comply with the limitations established for our sample. Thus, we 
have not included the “Teixeira Duarte” data, since, in the analysis period, this stock 
only had 20 months of negotiation. Therefore, although we could use this stock data for 
some strategies, with smaller observation and holding periods, we decided to consider 
                                                           
15
 NYSE - New York Stock Exchange 
16
 PSI - Portuguese Stock Index 
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the same number of stocks in all strategies, avoiding taking into account some stock 
returns in one and not in other strategies (and its consequent bias). 
As a result, the number of stocks in the sample varies between 11 at the beginning and 
51 stocks at the end of the studied sample. Since in the beginning, our sample only has 
11 stocks, winner and the loser portfolios are constituted by one stock each, however 
this only happens in the first three months. 
In addition to the Total Return Index (TRI), we have collected, from Datastream, the 
Market Capitalization Values and the Datastream Historical Betas17. In both cases, there 
are some data gaps, especially for periods prior to 1995. 
Essentially, this is the data required to implement the methodology presented in the 
following subsection. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
In the empirical part of our study, we have used the work of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) as a reference to construct the different momentum strategies, as well as the 
further tests and analysis.  
Hence, the strategies implemented in this study select stocks based on their past returns 
over the last 3, 6, 9 and 12 months and holds the selected stocks from 3, 6, 9 and 12 
months. By examining the profitability of a number of these strategies, our study 
investigates the efficiency of the Portuguese stock market. 
For the construction of the relative strength strategies, we needed to transform the daily 
data into monthly data. Thus, with the Total Return Index (TRI) we have calculated the 
monthly returns, as follows: 
Monthly Return t = ln (TRI last day of month t  / TRI last day of month t-1)          (1) 
                                                           
17
 “The beta factor is derived by performing a least squares regression between adjusted prices of the 
stock and the corresponding Datastream market index. The historic beta so derived is then adjusted using 
Bayesian techniques to predict the probable behavior of the stock price on the basis that any extreme 
behavior in the past is likely to average out in the future. This adjusted value, or "forecast" beta, is 
represented by the BETA datatype. The Datastream beta factor is calculated using stock prices and 
market indices as the only variables.” In Datastream Definitions Guide. 
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The relative strength strategies are constructed in the following way: at the end of each 
month t, all stocks are ranked into deciles based on their past J-month returns (J equals 
3, 6, 9 or 12). Based on these rankings, the stocks are assigned to one of ten decile 
portfolios, which are equally weighted at formation. In the extreme deciles we have the 
winner and the loser portfolios. In each month t, the strategy buys the winner portfolio 
and sells the loser, holding this position18 for the K subsequent months (K equals 3, 6, 9 
or 12 months) (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
A strategy with a J-month ranking period and a K-month holding period is a  
J-month/K-month strategy. As J and K can be equal to 3, 6, 9 or 12 months we studied a 
total of 16 strategies. 
Since bid-ask spread bounce can attenuate the continuation effect, we have reported a 
second set of 16 strategies that skip a month between the portfolio formation and the 
holding period. By delaying a month, as in Rouwenhorst (1998), we avoid some of the 
bid-ask spread, price pressure and lagged reaction effects that underlie the evidence 
documented in Lehmann (1990). 
To increase the power of these tests, the strategies we examined include portfolios with 
overlapping holding periods, i.e., in any given month t, the strategies hold a series of 
portfolios that are selected in the current month, as well as in the previous K-1 months. 
For instance, the winner portfolio of a 6-month/6-month strategy in December 
comprises 10% of the stocks with the highest returns over the previous June to 
November, May to October and so on, up to the previous January to June period.  
Following this approach, we have computed the average monthly returns of the different 
buy (winner) and sell (loser) portfolios, as well as the zero-cost (winners minus losers 
portfolios) and, for each of the ranking and holding periods, we have tested the 
significance19 of the excess returns from buying winners and selling losers 
(Rouwenhorst, 1998). 
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 During the holding period (K months) the portfolios are not re-balanced. 
19
 We used a t-test, whose the null hypothesis is that, for the same holding period, there is no difference in 
the average returns of winner and loser portfolios. 
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As a reference, we have calculated the average monthly returns of the market portfolio, 
which contains the whole sample of stocks used in this study weighted equally, for all 
the holding periods (3, 6, 9 our 12, with or without 1 month delay). 
To make the comparison between the zero-cost and the market portfolios, we have 
focused on the strategies that have 6 month ranking periods, with no delay in the 
formation of the portfolios. For each holding period, we conducted a hypothesis test to 
determine whether the difference between the average monthly returns of these two 
portfolios, in order to verify if the zero-cost strategy had significantly different average 
returns from those achieved by the market portfolio. In case we confirm that, we can 
conclude the existence of abnormal returns from this trading strategy. 
Since many of the studies on small capital markets20 have adopted a division of the 
stock data into quintiles instead of deciles, we have decided to rank the data into five 
portfolios for all the holding periods, in order to verify whether the obtained results are 
significantly altered. Therefore, the winner portfolio comprises 20% (instead of 10%) of 
the stocks with the highest returns over the previous 6 months period and the loser 
portfolio 20% of the stocks with the lowest returns. Thus, we present the average 
monthly returns in accordance with the portfolio construction suggested by Soares and 
Serra (2005) for the Portuguese stock market. 
As in the main literature, the remainder of our study will concentrate on portfolios 
formed on the basis of 6 month ranked returns and held for 6 months (6-month/6- month 
strategy), that does not skip a month between the portfolio formation period and the 
holding period.  
Centering on this strategy, we have calculated the average returns and standard 
deviations of its 10 deciles portfolios. Toward analyze the equality of returns of the 
relative strength portfolios, as in Rouwenhorst (1998), we have performed an F-test. 
To present a summary statistic for this strategy, we have estimated the portfolios’ 
averages for the two most common indicators of systematic risk: the post-ranking betas 
                                                           
20
 For example, Soares and Serra (2005) for the Portuguese stock market and Bildik and Gülay (2002) for 
the Istanbul Stock Market divided the data into quintiles.  
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of the ten 6-month/6-month relative strength portfolios and the average market 
capitalization of the stocks included on these portfolios.   
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the Betas and the Market Capitalization had 
some data flaws, especially in periods previous to 1995. In order to overcome this 
limitation, we have considered that stocks with missing data have a Beta or Market 
Capitalization equal to the average of the portfolio in which they belong. 
We did not examine the profitability of the 6 month/6 month relative strength strategies 
within size and beta subsamples, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), due to the reduced 
number of stocks in the Portuguese stock market. This kind of analysis would allow us 
to examine whether the profitability of the strategy is confined to any particular 
subsample stocks. This way, we would only be able to characterize the portfolios 
concerning to size or average beta. 
In addition, we have examined the returns of the momentum portfolio, also known as 
relative strength portfolio, in “Event Time” as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). This 
analysis can provide some evidence about the profitability of momentum strategies over 
long horizons for the Portuguese stock market. In case we observe significant positive 
returns in the months beyond the holding period (K=12), that would suggest that the 
zero-cost portfolio systematically selects stocks that have higher than average 
unconditional returns and, in case we observe significant negative returns, that would 
indicate that price changes during the holding period are at least partially temporary. 
Therefore, we have calculated the average monthly and cumulative returns of the zero-
cost portfolio in the 36 months after the portfolio formation date. We have also 
performed significance tests for the monthly average returns. 
Essentially, the tests and analysis that we present in this subsection, will allow us to 
verify the existence of return continuation over 3 to 12 months and to provide some 
evidence about the most relevant sources of momentum profitability, as the portfolio 
beta and the average size of stocks and as the long horizon momentum reversal study.  
In the next section, we will report the main findings provided by the presented 
methodology. 
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4. Main Findings 
We have decided to divide this section into three subsections. In the first one, we will 
present the main results of the 32 different strategies concerning to the average monthly 
returns. We will also establish a comparison between those results and the average 
returns of the equally weighted market portfolio. The second subsection, enumerates the 
major findings regarding the causes of momentum strategies, while, in the last one, we 
will report the results of the long horizon analysis. 
4.1. Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios 
This subsection documents the average returns of the momentum portfolios, between 
January 1988 and April 2012, using data from the Portuguese Stock Market.  
Table I reports the average returns of the different buy and sell portfolios, as well as the 
zero-cost (winners minus losers’ portfolios) for the 32 described strategies. The 
portfolios within Panel A are formed at the end of the performance ranking period, 
while the portfolios within Panel B are formed with one-month delay. 
The returns of all zero-cost portfolios are positive, i.e., past winners outperformed past 
losers. All excess returns of winners over losers are statistically significant at a 5 
percent level, being the strategies with smaller ranking periods significant at a 1 percent 
level.   
Regarding the possibility of momentum profits existence due to delayed reaction to new 
information, our results proved otherwise, since the average monthly returns in Panel B 
were higher than the average monthly returns in Panel A.  
The most successful zero-cost strategy, which provided the highest returns among the 
other strategies, select stocks based on their returns over the previous 3 months, 
skipping a month between the ranking period and the portfolio formation, and then 
holds the portfolio for 3 months (3-month/3-month strategy in Panel B). This zero-cost 
portfolio yields 1.84 percent per month (superior to the performance of the most 
successful zero-cost portfolio in Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) sample). For the same 
ranking and holding period, the bottom decile (loser) portfolio in Panel A performed 
24 
 
negative returns of -0.83 percent, 1.56 percent less than the top decile (winner) 
portfolio, which returns 0.73 percent.  
In Panel A, the most profitable zero-cost portfolio is the 6-month/3mmonth strategy, 
with an average monthly return of 1.74 percent. 
Table I 
Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios 
The relative strength portfolios are formed based on J-month lagged returns and held for K months. The 
values of J and K for the different strategies are indicated in the first column and row, respectively. The 
stocks are ranked into deciles based on the previous J-month performance and an equally weighted 
portfolio of the stocks in the bottom decile (lowest previous performance) is the loser portfolio and that in 
the top decile (highest previous performance) is the winner portfolio. The average monthly returns of 
these portfolios are reported in this table, as well as the average monthly returns of an equally weighted 
market portfolio. The portfolios in Panel A are formed immediately after the ranking period and the 
formation of the relative strength portfolios in Panel B occurs one month after the ranking takes place. 
The t-statistics reported are significant at 1 percent level (*) and at 5 percent level (**). The sample 
period is from January 1988 to April 2012. 
 
 
3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
3 Loser 0,0083 - 0,0088 - 0,0089 - 0,0075 - 0,0107 - 0,0101 - 0,0090 - 0,0074 - 
Winner 0,0073  0,0057  0,0039  0,0026  0,0078  0,0053  0,0036  0,0020  
Winner-Loser 0,0156  0,0145  0,0128  0,0101  0,0184  0,0154  0,0126  0,0094  
(t-stat) 3,5272  * 4,3236  * 4,4450  * 4,1147  * 4,1277  * 4,7249  * 4,4002  * 3,8624  *
6 Loser 0,0121 - 0,0112 - 0,0096 - 0,0087 - 0,0121 - 0,0107 - 0,0094 - 0,0082 - 
Winner 0,0052  0,0033  0,0020  0,0008  0,0060  0,0028  0,0014  0,0005  
Winner-Loser 0,0174  0,0145  0,0116  0,0095  0,0181  0,0135  0,0108  0,0087  
(t-stat) 3,9276  * 4,2062  * 4,0134  * 3,8142  * 3,9977  * 3,9891  * 3,8366  * 3,5043  *
9 Loser 0,0099 - 0,0094 - 0,0085 - 0,0077 - 0,0102 - 0,0093 - 0,0084 - 0,0073 - 
Winner 0,0048  0,0019  0,0001  0,0009 - 0,0037  0,0008  0,0006 - 0,0014 - 
Winner-Loser 0,0146  0,0113  0,0086  0,0068  0,0140  0,0101  0,0078  0,0059  
(t-stat) 3,2575  * 3,3793  * 3,0589  * 2,7224  * 3,2135  * 3,0731  * 2,7882  * 2,3790  **
12 Loser 0,0083 - 0,0077 - 0,0078 - 0,0072 - 0,0087 - 0,0083 - 0,0078 - 0,0069 - 
Winner 0,0008  0,0003 - 0,0006 - 0,0012 - 0,0002 - 0,0003 - 0,0008 - 0,0011 - 
Winner-Loser 0,0091  0,0074  0,0071  0,0060  0,0085  0,0079  0,0070  0,0058  
(t-stat) 2,0650  ** 2,2550  ** 2,4938  ** 2,3993  ** 1,9932  ** 2,4348  ** 2,5142  ** 2,4004  **
0,0010 - 0,0008 - 0,0006 - 0,0003 - 0,0009 - 0,0007 - 0,0009 - 0,0003 - 
Panel A Panel B
Average Monthly Returns 
of a Equally Weighted 
Market Portfolio
Ranking 
Period (J) Portfolio
Holding Period (K) Holding Period (K) 
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As in Rouwenhorst (1998) we verified that, independently of the interval used for 
ranking, the average monthly returns tend to fall for longer holding periods. 
In Table I, we report, as a reference, the average monthly return of an equally weighted 
market portfolio. When compared, the average monthly returns of the zero-cost 
portfolios, for each of the 32 strategies, are higher than the average monthly returns of 
the market portfolio. 
We can conclude, from the results of Table I, that relative strength strategies are on 
average quite profitable, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). For each of the ranking 
and holding periods, we can observe that past winners have outperformed past losers by 
about 1.1 percent per month. The monthly return ranges from 0.58 percent, in the 12-
month/12-month Panel B strategy, to 1.84 percent, in the 3-month/3-month Panel B 
strategy. 
In Table II, we report the differences between the relative strength portfolios and the 
market equally weighted portfolio, for the different K holding periods.  
As mentioned in the last section, many of the studies on small capital markets divided 
the stock data into quintiles instead of deciles. Nevertheless, we have decided to rank 
the data into five portfolios for all the holding periods, in order to verify whether the 
obtained results were significantly altered. Thus, we present the average monthly 
returns in accordance with the portfolio construction suggested by Soares and Serra 
(2005) for the Portuguese stock market and we have also compared them with the 
average returns of the market equally weighted portfolio. 
Although, for all the holding periods, the quintile zero-cost portfolios presented smaller 
average returns than the decile zero-cost portfolios, the main findings are the same and 
the difference between the monthly average returns is not significant.  
Thus, we have continued to use the decile portfolios in the remainder of our study, 
continuing to follow the portfolio construction presented by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993).  
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The hypothesis test performed to determine whether the zero-cost strategy had 
significant different average returns from those achieved by the market portfolio, allows 
us to conclude the existence of abnormal returns based on this trading strategy. 
 
 Table II 
Relative Strength Portfolios and Market Portfolio 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed based on six-month lagged returns and held for K months, 
with no delay in the portfolio formation. The values of K for the different strategies are indicated in the 
first column. In the second column the stocks are ranked into deciles and in the last column the stocks are 
ranked into quintiles. For each holding period, we conduct a hypothesis test to determine the difference 
between the average monthly returns of the relative strength portfolio and the market portfolio. All t-stat 
are significant at 1 percent level. 
 
Holding 
Period (K)
Average Return 
Deciles
Average Return 
Quintiles
3 Winner 0,0052 0,0051
Loser -0,0121 -0,0096
Winner - Loser 0,0174 0,0147
Average Monthly Returns of a 
Equally Weighted Market Portfolio -0,0010 -0,0010
T-stat 4,5570 4,6341
6 Winner 0,0033 0,0036
Loser -0,0112 -0,0089
Winner - Loser 0,0145 0,0125
Average Monthly Returns of a 
Equally Weighted Market Portfolio -0,0008 -0,0008
T-stat 5,0487 5,2061
9 Winner 0,0020 0,0024
Loser -0,0096 -0,0078
Winner - Loser 0,0116 0,0102
Average Monthly Returns of a 
Equally Weighted Market Portfolio -0,0006 -0,0006
T-stat 4,8390 4,9607
12 Winner 0,0008 0,0016
Loser -0,0087 -0,0064
Winner - Loser 0,0095 0,0079
Average Monthly Returns of a 
Equally Weighted Market Portfolio -0,0003 -0,0003
T-stat 4,4334 4,2578
27 
 
We can verify that, for the quintile strategies, the zero-cost portfolio have positive 
average returns, i.e., the six-month past winners outperformed the six-month past losers, 
for each of the K holding periods.  
In conclusion, for all the K holding periods, the winners minus losers portfolios 
significantly outperformed the equally weighted market portfolio. This market portfolio, 
for the different holding periods presented negative monthly average returns (although 
near zero), while the monthly average returns of the “buy past winners and sell past 
losers” strategies were positive.  
 
4.2. Causes of Relative Strength Profits 
The rest of our study concentrates on portfolios formed on six-month ranked returns 
basis, formed at the end of the ranking period and held for six months (6-month/6- 
month strategy), following the main literature (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001b; 
Rouwenhorst, 1998; etc.) 
In this subsection, we analyze the average returns and standard deviations of the ten 
relative strength portfolios (P1 to P10, being P1 the loser Portfolio and P10 the winner), 
connecting the obtained results with the two most common indicators of systematic risk: 
Betas and Market Capitalization. 
Focusing on the average returns, we can verify that the lowest past returns portfolios 
(from Loser Portfolio to P5) continued to have the worst performances in the six 
subsequent months and the ninth decile portfolio (P9) had the higher average return.  
Accordingly, the first column shows that higher past six-month returns is on average 
associated with stronger future six-month returns. Similarly to Rouwenhorst (1998) we 
have performed an F-test, that strongly rejected the equally hypothesis between the 
monthly average returns of the 10 relative strength portfolios. 
Rouwenhorst (1998) found a U-shaped standard deviation of decile portfolios. In our 
sample, the standard deviations were not perfectly U-shaped, although the winner and 
loser portfolios had higher standard deviations than the portfolios in the middle deciles. 
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Portfolios with higher standard deviations, caeteris paribus, are more likely to show 
more volatile performances (Rouwenhorst, 1998).  The standard deviation of the excess 
return of winners over losers is about 2.4 percent per month. 
Table III 
Betas and Market Capitalizations of Relative Strength Portfolios 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed based on six-month lagged returns and held for six months. 
The equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is the P1 or Loser Portfolio, the 
portfolio in the next decile is P2, and so on, being P10 the Winner Portfolio. The average returns of the 
ten portfolios and their standard deviation, average Beta and Market Capitalization (as a proxy of firm 
size) are reported here. The F-Statistic test for equality of average returns of the ten relative strength 
portfolios and it is significant at 1 percent level. The sample period is January 1988 to April 2012. 
 
 
In the third column, we report the average betas for the ten portfolios. Accordingly to 
the Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) results, the extreme decile portfolios have higher 
betas than the average beta (for the full sample).  
Since the beta of the losers’ portfolio is higher than the winners’ portfolio beta, the 
zero-cost portfolio has a negative beta not statistically different from zero, i.e., not 
significant. This leads us to conclude that the excess returns of winners over losers is 
unlikely explained by their covariance with the market, since, according to 
Average 
Return
Standard 
Deviation Beta
Market 
Capitalization 
(m€)
Loser -0,0112 0,0425 1,0203 496,6
P2 -0,0061 0,0400 0,8162 2621,2
P3 -0,0014 0,0369 0,7747 2301,2
P4 -0,0015 0,0344 0,8039 2590,6
P5 -0,0017 0,0378 0,7897 2778,2
P6 0,0013 0,0327 0,8104 2933,8
P7 0,0016 0,0353 0,8176 3101,2
P8 0,0018 0,0331 0,8327 3405,5
P9 0,0040 0,0337 0,8861 3007,4
Winner 0,0033 0,0389 0,9409 2586,5
Winner - Loser 0,0145 0,2401 -0,0793
Average 0,8492 2582,2
F-Test 4,4962
29 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998), it would be necessary for the beta of the winners to exceed the 
beta of the losers by about two, so that market risk could explain a continuation effect of 
1 percent per month. 
In the last column, we report the average market capitalizations of the decile portfolios. 
The findings are not surprising: as in Rouwenhorst (1998), the losers’ portfolio presents 
the lowest average size and both (winners and losers) are, on average, smaller than the 
mean.  
We did not examine the profitability of the 6-month/6-month relative strength strategies 
within size and beta subsamples, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), due to the reduced 
number of stocks in the Portuguese stock market. As we have already mentioned, this 
kind of analysis would allow us to examine whether the profitability of the strategy is 
confined to any particular subsample stocks, since extent empirical evidence indicates 
that size and beta are related to expected returns. 
Although this limitation, we can conclude that the deciles used in the winners-losers 
strategy are usually constituted by small-firms stocks. We can also suggest that the 
excess momentum returns cannot be explained by their portfolios’ betas.  
4.3. Performance of Relative Strength Portfolios in Long Horizons 
As in all the other studies on this subject, we could  not fail to analyze the performance 
of Relative Strength Portfolios in each of the 36 months following the portfolio 
formation date. 
This analyzes can also provide additional insights about whether the profits are due to 
overreaction or to underreaction.  
Table IV reports the average monthly and the cumulative returns of the zero-cost 
portfolio over 36 months after the formation date. 
The average monthly returns in the first year are positive, but, only in the first four 
months after the portfolio formation date, they show significant positive returns. The 
average monthly returns are both positive and negative during the second and the third 
year, which does not happen in the first year. 
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Table IV 
Performance of Relative Strength Portfolios in Long Horizons 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed based on six-month lagged returns. The equally weighted 
portfolio of the stocks in the bottom decile (lowest previous performance) is the sell portfolio and in the 
top decile (highest previous performance) is the buy portfolio. This table reports the average returns of the 
zero-cost, Winners minus Losers, portfolio in each month t following the formation period and the 
cumulative average returns. The sample goes from January 1988 to April 2012. We also present the t-
statistic for the monthly returns. The marked t-statistics are significant at a 1(*), 5(**) and 10 (***) 
percent level.  
 
 
t
Monthly 
Return
Cumulative 
Return
t
Monthly 
Return
Cumulative 
Return
t
Monthly 
Return
Cumulative 
Return
1 0,0129 0,0129 13 0,0007 0,1111 25 -0,0054 0,1134
t-stat 2,1737 ** t-stat 0,1228 t-stat -1,1174
2 0,0236 0,0364 14 0,0040 0,1151 26 0,0033 0,1166
t-stat 3,6444 * t-stat 0,6732 t-stat 0,6841
3 0,0177 0,0542 15 0,0024 0,1174 27 -0,0006 0,1160
t-stat 2,7567 * t-stat 0,4410 t-stat -0,1331
4 0,0118 0,0659 16 0,0049 0,1224 28 0,0028 0,1188
t-stat 1,8769 ** t-stat 0,9076 t-stat 0,6526
5 0,0095 0,0754 17 0,0036 0,1260 29 -0,0042 0,1146
t-stat 1,4764 *** t-stat 0,7114 t-stat -0,8588
6 0,0073 0,0828 18 -0,0021 0,1239 30 0,0047 0,1193
t-stat 1,2197 t-stat -0,3693 t-stat 0,9962
7 0,0042 0,0870 19 -0,0039 0,1201 31 -0,0078 0,1115
t-stat 0,7161 t-stat -0,6969 t-stat -1,3304 ***
8 0,0094 0,0964 20 -0,0017 0,1184 32 0,0045 0,1160
t-stat 1,4964 *** t-stat -0,2665 t-stat 0,7456
9 0,0036 0,1000 21 -0,0021 0,1163 33 -0,0035 0,1125
t-stat 0,6442 t-stat -0,3591 t-stat -0,5553
10 0,0046 0,1046 22 -0,0013 0,1149 34 0,0007 0,1133
t-stat 0,8438 t-stat -0,2329 t-stat 0,1176
11 0,0021 0,1068 23 0,0000 0,1149 35 0,0048 0,1181
t-stat 0,3782 t-stat -0,0030 t-stat 0,8325
12 0,0037 0,1104 24 0,0038 0,1188 36 -0,0008 0,1173
t-stat 0,6574 t-stat 0,7820 t-stat -0,1451
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The cumulative returns reach a maximum of 12.6 percent at the end of 17 months. 
However, we verified that, in the following months, this cumulative return does not 
reverse, standing approximately in 11 percent, which is a small decrease in relation to 
the maximum cumulative return reached. 
Figure I 
Evolution of the monthly and cumulative average returns in long horizons 
Figure I present the monthly and cumulative average returns of the zero-cost portfolio reported in Table 
IV. In the monthly returns we can observe significant positive returns and the graphics show perfectly the 
mixture of positive and negative returns verified specially in the third year. The line for the cumulative 
returns shows the inexistence of momentum return reversals over the 36 months period, especially when 
compared with the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s cumulative returns.  
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In their sample, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) observed negative returns beyond the 12th 
month, suggesting that the positive returns over the first 12 months may not be 
permanent. Contrarily to their findings, we did not observe consistently negative 
average monthly returns in the months beyond the holding period, but a mixture of, 
non-significant, positive and negative returns. 
Through our results, we are led to conclude that momentum strategies for the 
Portuguese stock market do not show any return reversal over long horizons. 
However, we cannot rule out that the positive returns in the first 12 months are due to 
overreaction or underreaction, since our results are a mixture of positive and negative 
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returns and, moreover, we did not find significantly different from zero monthly returns, 
at a 5 percent level, beyond the fourth month. 
Nevertheless, our results seem to draw some clues indicating underreaction as the main 
cause of the momentum profitability in this market, in line with the non-reversal returns 
in the long-term. 
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5. Conclusions 
By challenging the notions of Efficient Market Hypothesis, momentum strategies have 
attracted financial researchers to, not only, study the momentum profitability in 
different stock markets, but also to study different causes and explanations for these 
profits.  
Although several studies found evidence of momentum profitability, specifically for the 
Portuguese stock market, the studies done so far didn’t found statistically significant 
results that prove or disprove the existence of return predictability based on past returns. 
Therefore, our purpose was to explore, with an extended sample period, the existence of 
return continuation, as well as investigate the Portuguese stock market efficiency at the 
weak form level (Fama, 1970).  
As we have reported in the last section, the main findings of our study indicate the 
existence of momentum profitability in the short-run, confirming, thus, most of the 
results found in the main international literature, for large and liquid markets. 
Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) methodology, we analyzed 32 different 
momentum strategies. For all of them, past winners significantly outperform the past 
losers portfolio in about 1.1 percent per month, for each ranking and performance 
periods. For instance, a strategy that selects stocks based on their past 6-month returns 
and holds them for 6 months presents a 1.45 percent monthly return. 
Therefore, we were led to conclude that it is possible to predict future returns based on 
past performance, at least in the short run. Our findings seriously call into question the 
Market Efficiency Hypothesis in the Portuguese stock market, since, according to this 
assumption, there is no possibility to conceive profitable strategies based on past 
returns’ observations.  
Although the main findings of our study point to the existence of momentum profits in 
the Portuguese stock market, the momentum causes are not, yet, fully ascertained. Due 
to the reduced number of stocks, we are not able to perform size and beta subsamples, 
as in the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Nevertheless, following the Rouwenhorst (1998) 
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example, we characterized all the deciles’ portfolios regarding to their volatility, their 
beta and firms size. 
Through this characterization, we could verify that winner’s and loser’s portfolios 
presented higher volatility than the portfolios in the middle deciles, and both winner’s 
and loser’s portfolios are constituted by small stocks on average, being the losers 
smaller than the winners. Concerning to the most common risk factor, our portfolios’ 
betas seem to suggest that momentum profits are unlikely explained by risk, since the 
winners’ beta are even lower than the losers’. However, it should be noted that these 
findings were obtained through a portfolios' characterization and we didn’t performed 
statistical tests that allow us to obtain conclusive results. Therefore, especially the risk 
explanations could be an interesting matter for further investigations. 
Lastly, concerning to the performance of momentum profits over long horizons, we 
found that there is no significant return reversals over long horizons, contrarily to 
Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) findings. After reaching maximum cumulative return, at 
the 17th month, the return reversals are very low (about 1 percent).  
However, we cannot rule out that the positive returns in the first 12 months are due to 
overreaction or underreaction, since our results are not consistent, in the long run. 
Moreover, we did not find monthly returns significantly different from zero, at a 5 
percent level, beyond the fourth month. 
Nevertheless, our findings seem to draw some clues indicating underreaction as the 
main cause of the momentum profitability in this market, in line with the non-reversal 
returns in the long-term.  
The explanations for the existence of underreaction can be extracted from behavioral 
models. However, these models consider both short-term momentum and long-term 
reversals (overreaction). Therefore, the evidence of underreaction found can be 
associated to a slowly adjustments from the investors, as in the Barberis et al. (1998) 
model, for instance. According to this, investors suffer from a conservative bias and do 
not update their beliefs after observing new public information, causing the prices to 
underreact. This model also admitted the possibility of price overshooting due to 
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representative heuristic, thus, in the long-term, prices would readjust to their 
fundamental values, causing returns reversals. 
The research questions, exposed in the introductory section, can be satisfactorily 
answered with the obtained results. We are able to conclude, with statistical 
significance, that: 
- It is possible to predict future returns using past performance observations, resulting 
in significant positive returns over three to twelve months holding periods. 
- Momentum strategies can outperform the market portfolio returns.  
- Although our results are not statistically significant regarding the long-term 
performance, our data seems to support the underreaction hypothesis.  
However, we should always present these results with some caution, because there may 
be limitations derived from the methodological choices that we have made. For 
instance, in our sample we only take into account stocks that belong to PSI Geral, i.e., 
we only consider stocks that remain “alive”, contrarily to Soares and Serra (2005), 
which can induct a “survivorship bias” to our results. Concerning to this option, our 
choice can be justified by our pretension to obtain the largest sample period possible 
compared to the available data. Nevertheless, although we did not know the impact due 
to “survivorship bias” in their results, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that our results 
may have been influenced by this bias. 
Beyond the achieved results, have remained some interesting questions to consider, 
such as the momentum profitability when the risks are adjusted by the CAPM or the 
Fama and French Three Factor Model. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 1996) perform this 
analysis, as well as Soares and Serra (2005) for the Portuguese stock market, however 
with different conclusions regarding to the significance of the risk component in 
momentum profitability. 
Thus, it is possible to verify that there are some issues to address, not only regarding to 
the risk based explanations, but also concerning to the behavioral perspective. It would 
be of interest, for instance, further research attempting to identify other momentum 
explanations. 
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